Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

Karen H. Schriever v. Deere Credit Services Inc. :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul W. Werner; Mark E. Hindly; Stoel Rives; Alyson Draper; Nalder Stratford and Draper; Attorney
for Appellee.
William D. Marsh; Attorney for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Schriever v. Deere Credit Services, No. 20000245.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/445

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KAREN H. SCHRIEVER,
Appellant,
v.
DEERE CREDIT SERVICES, INC.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE DEERE
CREDIT SERVICES

Docket Number 20000245-SC
District Ct. No. 980100263
Argument Priority No. 15

Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR BOX ELDER
COUNTY, JUDGE CLINT S. JUDKINS

William D. Marsh (#2094)
One Utah Center, Suite 900
201 S. Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 535-4659
Attorney for Appellant
ECaren H. Schriever

Alyson Draper
Nalder Stratford & Draper LC
2404 Washington Blvd. Suite 1020
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 393-8700
Attorney for Owen Tustian

SaltLake-127395.1

0032672-00001

Paul W. Werner (#7342)
Mark E. Hindley (#7222)
STOEL RIVES LLP
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-4904
Telephone: (801)328-3131
Attorneys for Appellee
Deere Credit Services

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KAREN H. SCHRIEVER,
Appellant,

DEERE CREDIT SERVICES, INC.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE DEERE
CREDIT SERVICES

Docket Number 20000245-SC
District Ct. No. 980100263
Argument Priority No. 15

Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR BOX ELDER
COUNTY, JUDGE CLINT S. JUDKINS

William D. Marsh (#2094)
One Utah Center, Suite 900
201 S. Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 535-4659
Attorney for Appellant
Karen H. Schriever

Alyson Draper
Nalder Stratford & Draper LC
2404 Washington Blvd. Suite 1020
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 393-8700
Attorney for Owen Tustian

SaltLake-127395 1 0032672-00001

Paul W. Werner (#7342)
Mark E. Hindley (#7222)
STOEL RIVES LLP
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-4904
Telephone: (801)328-3131
Attorneys for Appellee
Deere Credit Services

PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following are
parties to this appeal:
Karen H. Schriever as Appellant.
Deere Credit Services, Inc. as Appellee.
Contrary to Appellant's statement of the parties, "H. Tustian" (a referrence to Mr.
Owen Tustian who was a party before the trial court) is not a party to this appeal. Mr.
Tustian did not file a notice of appeal to be an appellant and because the trial court
declared that Schriever has priority over Mr. Tustian to the funds at issue in this appeal,
Mr. Tustian is not an appellee. Accordingly, Schriever and Deere Credit are the only
parties to this appeal.
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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

Statement of Issues

1.

Did the district court correctly determine that Appellee Deere Credit

Services' ("Deere") perfected purchase money security interest ("PMSI") in the modular
home (the "Modular Home") attached to the proceeds from the sale of the Modular
Home?
2.

Did the district court correctly determine that no fixture filing was

necessary to maintain Deere's perfected PMSI in the Modular Home because Deere had
perfected its security interest by filing a UCC-1 covering the Home?
3.

Did the district court correctly determine that Deere was not required to file

a fixture filing to maintain its perfected security interest in the Modular Home because the
Home was not legally affixed to real property?
B.

Standard of Review

Deere agrees that summary judgment is a question of law to be reviewed for
correctness. The appeals court need only determine: (1) whether the district court erred in
applying the governing law, and (2) whether the district court correctly held that there
were no disputed issues of material fact. Glover ex rel. Dyson v. Boy Scouts of America.
923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This case involves the priority of the parties' claims over approximately $25,000
in excess proceeds derived from a trustee's sale of a Modular Home (the "Excess
Proceeds"). The trustee sold the Home to satisfy a deed of trust executed by Pinnacle
Financial Services, Inc. ("Pinnacle"). It is undisputed that at the time of the sale Deere
Credit Service, Inc. ("Deere") held a perfected purchase money security interest
("PMSI") in the Modular Home. Despite this, Appellant Karen H. Schriever
("Schriever") argued to the district court that as a judgment lienor of Pinnacle she had
priority to the Excess Proceeds over Deere. In support of her contention, Schriever
asserted that when the Modular Home was affixed to real property, Deere failed to
maintain its perfected security interest in the Modular Home by not making a fixture
filing.
The district court rejected Schriever's argument. Relying on Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-9-313(4)(d), the court held that Deere was not required to file a fixture filing to
maintain its security interest in the Modular Home because Deere had already perfected
its interest in the Home in its UCC-1 filing. Alternatively, the district court held that no
fixture filing was required because the Modular Home was not legally affixed to real
property under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-602 for purposes of maintaining a security
interest. Accordingly, the district court held that Deere had priority over Schriever to the
Excess Proceeds. This appeal followed.
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B.

Procedural History

On April 20,1998, William Tustian filed a Complaint against Schriever and
Deere seeking to establish priority to the Excess Proceeds. (R. 1-13.) Schriever filed a
Notice of Interest in the Excess Proceeds on November 12, 1998. (R. 233.) Deere filed a
Notice of Interest in the Excess Proceeds on December 8, 1998. (R. 233.) On June 10,
1999, the district court heard oral argument from the parties and determined that the
parties' pleadings would be considered as cross-motions for summary judgment. (R. 54142.) The Court granted a request that the parties be able to submit supplemental
memoranda. (R. 542.) The district court, Judge Clint S. Judkins, presiding, heard oral
argument and entered an order granting Deere's cross-motion for summary judgment,
granting in part Schriever's cross-motion for summary judgment, and denying Tustian's
cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 550.) A copy of the district court's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached hereto as Exhibit A. A copy of the district
court's judgment is attached as Exhibit B.
C.

Disposition in the District Court

The district court held that (1) Deere perfected a PMSI in the Modular Home by
filing its UCC-1; (2) because there was no sale of the Modular Home prior to the trustee's
sale, Deere's perfected PMSI continued in the Modular Home until the Modular Home
was sold by the trustee; (3) after the trustee's sale, Deere's perfected security interest
attached automatically to the proceeds of the sale of the Modular Home; (4) Deere was
not obligated to file a fixture filing to maintain its perfected security interest in the
SaltLake-127395 1 0032672-00001
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Modular Home because Deere had already perfected its interest in the Modular Home in
its UCC-1 filing; and (5) Deere was not obligated to file a fixture filing to maintain its
interest in the Modular Home because the Home was not legally affixed to real property
under Utah law. (R. 546-547.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Undisputed Facts

The following facts are undisputed:
1.

Pinnacle Financial Services, Inc., operating under the name of Outlook

Homes and/or Outlook Homes, Inc. ("Pinnacle") was engaged in the business of selling
manufactured homes and related goods. (R. 542 at ^f 1; R. 443, Aff. of Kevin Peters
("Peters Depo."), at R. 444.)
2.

On or about April 12, 1996, Deere and Pinnacle entered into an agreement

pursuant to which Deere agreed to finance Pinnacle's acquisition of manufactured homes.
The terms of the parties' agreement were memorialized in two principal documents, the
"Inventory Security Agreement and Power of Attorney-Manufactured Homes" and an
accompanying "Terms Schedule" (collectively, the "Credit Agreement"). (R. 543 at ^ 2;
R. at 415-423; R. 443, Peters Aff, at R. 444-45.)
3.

In accordance with the terms of the Credit Agreement, Pinnacle granted

Deere a purchase money security interest in, among other things, all inventory of
Pinnacle, together with all attachments to and proceeds of such inventory (the
"Collateral"). (R. 543 at % 3; R. at 416; Peters Aff., at R. 445; R. 443.)
SaltLake-127395.1 0032672-00001
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4.

On or about April 15, 1996, Deere filed with the Utah Department of

Commerce, Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, a UCC-1 financial statement
evidencing its security interest in the Collateral.

(R. 543 at 1 3 ; R. 443, Peters Aff., at R.

445; R. 459-60.)
5.

Following execution of the Credit Agreement and financing statement,

Deere extended credit to Pinnacle for the acquisition of various manufactured homes,
including the Modular Home at issue in this case. (R. 543 at ^ 543; R. 443, Peters Aff., at
R. 445; R. 461.)
6.

Moduline Industries, the manufacturer of the Modular Home, delivered the

Manufacturer's Statement of Origin ("MSO") to Deere, as the lien holder, to hold as
evidence of ownership. (R. 543-44 at If 4; R. 443, Peters Aff, at R. 445-46; R. 462.)
7.

After Pinnacle's purchase of the Modular Home, Pinnacle moved the Home

from its sales office to real property owned by Pinnacle located at 10025 North 6800
West, Tremonton, Utah (the "Tremonton Property"). (R. 544 at f 7; R. 443, Peters Aff.,
at R. 446; R. 463.)
8.

At the time of the transfer of the Modular Home to the Tremonton Property,

Pinnacle executed a trust deed with respect to the Property in favor of Sodberry Ltd. (the
"Sodberry Trust Deed"). (R. 544 at 1f 8; R. 427-29.)
9.

In October 1997, Pinnacle defaulted on its obligations arising under the

Credit Agreement, including payment for the Modular Home, in the approximate amount
of $42,000. Pinnacle also defaulted on its obligations to Sodberry Ltd. On November 26,
SaltLake-127395.1 0032672-00001
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1997, the successor trustee under the Sodberry Trust Deed filed a Notice of Default with
the Box Elder County Recorder. (R. 544 at ^ 9.)
10.

On January 7, 1998, Schreiver filed an abstract ofjudgment, purported to

have been entered on January 6, 1998. (R. 212.)
11.

On April 1, 1998, the Property, with the Modular Home, was sold at a

trustee's sale pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-28. (R. 544 at f 10; R. 270-73.) Before
the trustee's sale of the Property, Pinnacle had not sold the Modular Home.
12.

After satisfying Pinnacle's obligations arising under the Sodberry Trust

Deed and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-29 and Rule 4-507 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, the trustee deposited with the Clerk of the First Judicial District
Court of Box Elder County the Excess Proceeds arising from the sale of the Property in
the amount of $25,155.56, and notified the court clerk of potential claimants to the Excess
Proceeds. (R. 544 at If 11; R. 270-73.)
13.

In order to preserve and assert its claim to the Excess Proceeds, Deere

timely submitted a Notice of Claim for the Excess Proceeds. (R. at 545; R. 233.)
14.

Before the trustee's sale of the Property, Pinnacle had not sold the Modular

Home. Deere continues to hold the original MSO, no one has contacted Deere to request
tranfer of the MSO, no discussion of a sale was made during the course of Deere's
Business Relationship with Pinnacle, no notices have been received by Deere, and no
certificate of title or affidavit of affixture has been issued with respect to the Modular
Home. (R. 544-45 at 112; R. 443, Peters Aff., at 446-48.)
SaltLake-127395 1 0032672-00001
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15.

As of December 10, 1998, Deere's claim against Pinnacle, secured by its

perfected security interest in Pinnacle's Collateral-the Modular Home and its proceeds-is
approximately $145,922.64, excluding costs and attorneys' fees permitted under
Paragraph 12.6 of the Credit Agreement. (R. 443, Peters Aff, at 448.)
16.

On February 23, 2000, the district court, Judge Clint S. Judkins,

presiding, entered an order and judgment in Deere's favor on Deere's claim of priority in
the Excess Proceeds. (R. at 541-52; see Exs. A & B.) This appeal followed.
B.

Response to Schriever's Statement of Facts

1.

Schriever's Fact No. 3. The fact that Deere's UCC-1 lists Pinnacle's

address as 1341 Washington Blvd, Ogden and mentions neither Outlook Homes nor
Outlook's sales lot is irrelevant to this action. It is undisputed that Pinnacle was doing
business as Outlook Homes. (R. 443, Peters Aff, at R. 444.) Indeed, Schriever's own
Notice of Claim states that Pinnacle Financial Services was doing business as Outlook
Homes. (R. 207.)
2.

Schriever's Fact No. 6. Schriever cites to no evidence for the proposition

that the Modular Home "was not held as inventory for sale for any determinable time."
There in nothing in the record to suggest that the Modular Home was anything but
inventory purchased under the Credit Agreement. Moreover, Schreiver cites to no
evidence for the proposition that the "home was placed on a foundation." There is
nothing in the record to suggest that the Modular Home was physically affixed to the
property near Tremonton, Utah.
SaltLake-127395.1 0032672-00001
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3.

Schriever's Fact No. 20 & 21. Schriever claims that Deere did not "assert

any interest" in the Excess Proceeds in its motions to quash Mr. Tustian's Complaint,
suggesting that Deere was required to do so. Schriever's suggestion is wrong. The proper
procedure for determining priority over excess proceeds is to file a "Notice of Claim"
pursuant to Rule 4-507 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Deere filed its
Notice of Claim on December 8, 1998. (R. 233-38.) Schriever filed a notice of claim on
November 12, 1998. (R. 207-11.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court properly held that Deere had priority to the Excess Proceeds over
Schreiver for three reasons. First, Deere held a perfected security interest in the Modular
Home, and after the trustee's sale of the Home, Deere's perfected PMSI attached
automatically to the proceeds of the sale of the Home. Second, no fixture filing was
required for Deere to maintain its security interest in the Modular Home regardless of
affixture, because Deere had already perfected its interest in the Modular Home in its
UCC-1 filing. Third, even assuming the Modular Home were physically affixed to real
property, no fixture filing was required for Deere to maintain its perfected security
interest in the Modular Home, because the Home was not legally affixed to real property
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-602. Accordingly, the district court properly determined
that Deere has priority over Schriever for the Excess Proceeds.

SaltLake-127395.1 0032672-00001
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Correctly Held that Under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(3)
Deere's Perfected PMSI in the Modular Home Attached to the Proceeds of
the Trustee's Sale of the Modular Home.
In her brief, Schriever concedes that Deere obtained a perfected PMSI under Utah

Code Ann. § 70A-9-302(3)(b) when it filed its UCC-1. (Schriver's Br. at 7.) Moreover,
it is undisputed that the Modular Home was never sold prior to the trustee's sale.
Accordingly, Schriever does not attack the district court holding that Deere perfected
PMSI in the Modular Home continued in the Home until the Home was sold by the
Trustee on April 1, 1998. (R. 546 at 13-4.)
Instead, Schriever argues that once the Modular Home was attached to the
Tremonton Property, Deere's perfected PMSI ended. Schreiver is wrong. If Deere were
claiming that it currently had a perfected security interest in the Modular Home itself, and
had Pinnacle sold the Modular Home, the sale might have extinguished Deere's security
interest in the Home. Id. l However, Pinnacle never sold the Modular Home.2 Instead,

1

Lien filings for mobile homes (and other vehicles subject to § 41-la-501) which
are held as inventory are governed by § 41-la-601(2) which states that "[s]ecurity
interests in inventory consisting in part of vehicles subject to registration under this
chapter, that are held for sale by a person in the business of selling goods of that kind,
shall be perfected under Section 70A-9-302
" Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-601(2).
Under Section 70A-9-302(l), "[a] financing statement must be filed to perfect all security
interests." This is exactly what Deere did to secure its security interest in the Modular
Home.
2

Schriever conceeds that the only existing evidence of ownership of the Modular
Home (prior to the trustee's sale) is the MSO, which is in Deere's possession.
(Schriever's Opening Br. at 5, f 9.) The MSO is a prerequisite to obtaining a certificate
SaltLake-127395.1 0032672-00001
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the trustee under the Sodberry Trust Deed sold the Modular Home and deposited the
Excess Proceeds with the Court. The Excess Proceeds from a trustee's sale now stand in
the place of the Modular Home as collateral. It is in the Excess Proceeds, not in the
Modular Home itself, which Deere now has a perfected security interest. Section 70A-9306(3)(b) of the UCC sets forth the rules for maintaining a perfected security interest in
proceeds. This provision states:
The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security
interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but ceases to
be a perfected security interest and becomes unperfected after ten days after
receipt of the proceeds by the debtor unless
(b)
a filed financing statement covers the original
collateral and the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(3)(b).
The term "proceeds" is defined as "whatever is received upon the sale, lease,
exchange, collection, or other disposition of collateral." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(l).
Thus, after the disposition of secured goods, this provision operates to protect the security
interest on the resulting proceeds automatically for ten days, and indefinitely thereafter if
"a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are identifiable
cash proceeds." I d § 70A-9-306(3)(b).
Applying Section 70A-9-306(3)(b) to this case, Deere clearly maintained a
continuously perfected security interest in the Excess Proceeds. The Excess Proceeds

of title. Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-508, -509, - 710.
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arose out of the trustee's sale of the Modular Home and therefore constitute "proceeds"
under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(l). Deere's perfected security interest in the Excess
Proceeds continues because Deere's UCC-1 statement covered the original collateral (i.e.,
the Modular Home as inventory) and the Excess Proceeds are cash proceeds that were
readily identifiable and held in the district court's trust account. Accordingly, the district
court properly held that under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(3)(b), Deere's security
interest attached to the Excess Proceeds after the trustee's sale and remained continuously
valid. (R. 546 at f 5.)
II.

The District Court Correctly Rejected Schriever's Argument that Deere Was
Required to File a Fixture Filing to Maintain Its Perfected Security Interest in
the Modular Home.
Schriever principal objection to the district court's order is her belief that once the

Modular Home became affixed,3 Deere lost its perfected security interest in the Modular
Home because Deere did not file a fixture filing. Therefore, according to Schriever,

3

Schriever assumes that the Modular Home was physically affixed to property.
However, this fact is disputed. In fact, there is nothing in the record suggesting that the
Modular Home was physically affixed. Because this fact is disputed, it was not a basis
for the the district court's ruleing. Indeed, this disputed fact is immaterial to the
resolution of this case because, as the district court properly determined, the statutory
priority rules favor Deere over Schriever regardless of physical affixture. (R. 546-47 at 1fl|
6-7.)
Even if this court were persuaded by Schriever's legal argument, Schriever is not
entitled to the request she seeks (namely to have the district court disburse the funds to
Schriever, see Schreiver Opening Br. at 11) because there is no evidence of physical
attachment to real property. In fact, the Trustee described the Modular Home as
"personalty." (R. 271 ("John Deere . . . may claim some interest in the excess proceeds as
a secured creditor with a security interest in personalty located on the property.")
SaltLake-127395.1
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Deere's failure to file a fixture filing renders any claim it may have to the Excess
Proceeds inferior to Appellant Schriever's judgment lien.
Even assuming the Modular Home was physically affixed to the Tremonton
Property, Schriever's argument fails for two reasons: (1) Deere was not required to file a
fixture filing to maintain its perfected security interest in the Modular Home because
Deere had already perfected its interest in the Home in its UCC-1 filing; and (2) Deere
was not required to file a fixture filing because the Modular Home was not legally affixed
to real property under Utah law for purposes of maintaining security interests.
A.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-313(4)(d), No Fixture Filing Was
Required to Maintain Deere's Perfected PMSI in the Modular Home
Because Deere Had Already Perfected Its Interest in Its UCC-1 Filing.

In arguing that Deere should have filed a fixture filing, Schriever ignores Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-9-313(4)(d). This section states:
A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting interest of
an encumbrancer . . . of the real estate where:
(d)
the conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate
obtained by legal or equitable proceedings after the security
interest was perfected by any method permitted by this
chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
This statute is clear: a security interest in a good which is perfected "by any
method" will have priority over any subsequent legal or equitable lien even though the

SaltLake-127395.1 0032672-00001
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good later becomes physically affixed to land without having to file a fixture filing.4
According to the UCC commentators:
[P]riority based on precedence in filing or recording is preserved, but there
is no requirement t h a t . . . the prior filing of the fixture security interest [i.e.,
a fixture filing] must be in the real estate records.... Thus, even a prior
filing in the chattel records [i.e., a UCC-1] protects the priority of a fixture
security interest against a subsequent judgment lien.
Uniform Commercial Code, § 9-313, cmt 4(c) (emphasis added) (Exhibit H). Other
authorities have reached the same conclusion. See William D. Hawkland, et al., Uniform
Commercial Code Series § 9-313:05 (Exhibit F) ("[T]here is no additional requirement
that the security interest in fixtures be perfected as a fixture filing . . . . Thus, so long as
the fixture financier perfects his interest in any manner permitted under Article 9, he will
prevail against lien creditors."); 4 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform
Commercial Code § 33-10(c), at 346 (4th ed. 1995) ("The drafters of 9-313(4)(d)
believed that the trustee in bankruptcy, like the ordinary judgment creditor, was not a
reliance creditor and thus should be subordinated to any secured creditor who had
perfected by any method, i.e., a personalty filing in the Article 9 files or a fixture filing in
the real estate records.").
The case law applying section 9-313(d)(4) also recognizes that no fixture filing is
required to maintain a perfected security interest under section 9-313(4)(d). For example,

4

This is consistent with the other relevant portions of the UCC. See Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-9-313(2) ("A security interest under this chapter . . . may continue in goods
which become fixtures."); id. ("A filing which is made in the proper place in this state
continues effective even though the . . . collateral or its use . . . is thereafter changed.").
SaltLake-127395.1
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in In re Lucero. 203 B.R.322, 324-25 (10th Cir. BAP 1996), a bankruptcy trustee sought to
avoid a previously perfected lien on a debtor's mobile home by arguing (like Schriever)
that the holder of the lien should have filed a fixture filing. The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appeals Panel rejected this argument by recognizing that section 9-313(4)(d) exempts
previously perfected secured parties from having to file a fixture filing.5 Similarly, in In
re Allen, 221 B.R. 232 (S.D. 111. 1998), the court stated:
In the majority of fixture priority disputes, the security interest must be
perfected by filing a financing statement in the real estate records— known
as a "fixture filing" . . . —in order to prevail over a preexisting or
subsequently recorded interest in the real estate. However, under
§ 9-313(4)(d), when the conflicting real estate interest is a judgment lien
acquired after perfection of the fixture security interest, such perfection
need not be by filing in the real estate records, but may be by any method
permitted by [Article 9].
Id. at 233-34 (emphasis added).
Thus, the clear language of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-313(4)(d), the applicable
case law, and the commentators' analysis of this section all point to one conclusion: that
Deere did not have to file a fixture filing to maintain its security interest in the Modular
Home. Instead, because Deere had previously perfected its security interest in the
Modular Home, Deere's security interest remained perfected regardless of affixture.

5

The BAP also noted that the parties' arguments of whether the mobile home had
become attached "overlook the most relevant provisions of... state law," referring
specifically to section 9-313(4)(d). 203 B.R. at 324. This Court should recognize that the
arguments of affixture by the parties in this case are of secondary importance behind the
application of section 9-313(4)(d).
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Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's Judgment awarding Deere the
Excess Proceeds.
B.

Deere Was Not Required to File a Fixture Filing Because the Modular
Home Was Not Legally Affixed to Real Property Under Utah Code
Ann. § 59-2-602.

Deere was also not required to file a fixture filing under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2602 because this section draws a distinction between physical and legal affixture. This
statute states:
[A]ny person owning a manufactured home or mobile home and owning the
real property to which the manufactured home or mobile home is
permanently affixed who seeks to have the manufactured home or mobile
home qualify as an improvement to real property may file an affidavit of
affixture with the county recorder of the county in which the real property is
located.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-602(1) (emphasis added.) Thus, under this provision, a mobile or
manufactured home may be physically affixed to land, but still not qualify as a legal
fixture to the land. To qualify as a legal fixture, this section requires an owner to file an
affidavit of affixture. Here, it is undisputed that no affidavit of affixture was filed. (See
Schriever's Opening Br. at 5, ^f 9 ("No . . . affidavit of affixture was issued with respect to
the [Modular Home].).) Thus, the Modular Home, even if physically affixed, was not
legally affixed for the Mobile Home "to qualifty as an improvement to real property."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-602(1).
Schriever argues that Section 59-2-602 deals only with taxation of manufactured
homes, and therefore, does not purport to identify when a manufactured home becomes
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"legally affixed" for purposes of secured interests. Schriever's argument ignores the
plain language of Section 59-2-602. Indeed, the Utah Code specifically provides that:
Upon recording of the affidavit of affixture and the receipt of surrender
[i.e., the MSO or the title], the manufactured home or mobile home is for all
purposes an improvement upon real property. A lien on the manufactured
home or mobile home shall be perfected in the manner provided for the
perfection of a lien on real property.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-602(5) (emphasis added).
In other words, under Utah law, it is only at that time an owner files an affidavit of
affixture that a party must make a fixture filing to maintain a perfected interest in a
manufactured home. Applying Sections 59-2-602(1) & (5) in this manner dovetails
perfectly with Section 70A-9-313(4)(d) discussed above. In this case, no affidavit of
affixture was ever filed by Pinnacle, or any other party. Therefore, the Modular Home
did not qualify as a legal fixture to land. Because the Modular Home never became
legally affixed to land, Deere was not required to file a fixture filing to maintain its
perfected PMSI.6
In sum, the resolution of this case is straightfoward: Deere obtained a perfected
PMSI in the Modular Home by filing a UCC-1. Deere's perfected PMSI continued until
the trustee's sale of the Home, at which time Deere's security interest attached

6

Schriever cites to Webb v. Interstate Land Corp., 920 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1986) in
his argument that Deere should have filed a fixture filing. However, Webb does not help
Schriever. Webb is simply a restatement of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-313(l)(a) and (b).
The Webb court did not address Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-313(4)(d) nor § 59-2-602, nor
did the Court have a reason to do so. Thus, Webb is inapplicable to this case.
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automatically to the proceeds of that sale under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(3)(b).
Accordingly, Deere has priority to the Excess Proceeds over all judgment lienors,
including Schriever. Even assuming that the Modular Home was physically affixed to
real property, Deere was not required to file a fixture filing to maintain its PMSI. Under
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-313(4)(d), no fixture filing was necessary because Deere had
already perfected its interest in the Modular Home in its UCC-1 filing. Moreover, under
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-602, no fixture filing was required because the Modular Home
was not legally affixed to real property. Therefore, the district court properly established
Deere's priority over Schriever to the Excess Proceeds.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Deere respectfully submits that this Court affirm the
district court's decision awarding Deere the Excess Proceeds.
Respectfully Submitted this J _

da

Y of October, 2000.
STOEL RIVES LLP

>aiil W. Werner <
Mark E. Hindley
Attorneys for Appellee
Deere Credit Services
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FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER GRANTING DEERE
CREDIT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SETTING PRIORITIES TO
EXCESS PROCEEDS PURSUANT
TO RULE 4-507
Case No. 980100263
Judge Clint S. Judkins

This dispute involves the priority of excess proceeds from a trustees sale of property that
are held by this Court (the "Excess Proceeds"). The parties to the dispute include Deere Credit
Services, Inc. ("Deere"), William Tustian ("Tustian"), and Karen Schriever ("Schriever").1 On

1

On April 20, 1998, Tustian, filed a complaint against Schriever and Deere for the
Excess Proceeds. William Marsh, Brent Madsen, and the First District Court were also named
as Defendants in the complaint. These latter parties, however, have made no claim for the
Excess Proceeds and are hereby dismissed from the suit with prejudice.
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June 10, 1999, this Court heard oral arguments from the parties and determined that the parties'
pleadings would be considered as cross-motions for summary judgment.2 The Court granted
Tustian's request that the parties be able to submit supplemental memoranda. On December 30,
1999, after the parties had submitted their supplemental memoranda, this Court held another
hearing to give counsel an opportunity to argue their respective positions.
Having fully considered the parties' memoranda, affidavits, and exhibits, and having
heard the argument of counsel, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and, as a matter of law, grants Deere's cross-motion for summary judgement, grants in part
and denies in part Schriever's cross-motion for summary judgment, and denies Tustian's crossmotion for summary judgment.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to the following facts:
A.

Deere's Security Interest in the Modular Home
1.

Pinnacle Financial Services, Inc., a Utah corporation which operated under the

trade name of Outlook Homes and/or Outlook Homes, Inc. ("Pinnacle/Outlook"), was engaged in
the business of selling manufactured homes and related goods.

2

Neither Schriever nor Tustian filed a notice of claim as required under Rule 4-507
of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Nevertheless, this Court will treat Tustian's and
Schriever's pleadings as notices of claim under Rule 4-507.
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2.

On or about April 12, 1996, Deere and Pinnacle/Outlook entered into an

agreement pursuant to which Deere agreed to finance Pinnacle/Outlook's acquisition of
manufactured homes. The terms of the parties' agreement was memorialized in two principal
documents, the "Inventory Security Agreement and Power of Attorney — Manufactured Homes"
and an accompanying "Terms Schedule" (collectively, the "Credit Agreement").
3.

Pursuant to the Credit Agreement and in order to secure performance of its

obligations under the Credit Agreement, Pinnacle/Outlook granted Deere a purchase money
security interest in, among other things, all inventory of Pinnacle/Outlook, together with all
attachments to and proceeds of such inventory (the "Collateral"). On or about April 15, 1996,
Deere duly filed with the Utah Department of Commerce, Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code, a UCC-1 financing statement evidencing its security interest in the Collateral.
4.

From time to time following the execution of the Credit Agreement and financing

statement, Deere extended credit to Pinnacle/Outlook for the purchase of various manufactured
homes, including its purchase of a certain Moduline modular home, serial no. 116366 (the
"Modular Home") from Moduline Industries, Inc., in October 1996 as part of its inventory.
5.

Moduline Industries prepared and submitted an invoice for the purchase of the

Modular Home directly to Deere, as the financing lender for the purchase. The invoice identifies
Pinnacle/Outlook as both the party purchasing and receiving the Modular Home and Deere as the
financing lender.
6.

Moduline Industries also forwarded the original Manufacturer's Statement of

Origin (the "MSO") to Deere, as the lien holder, to hold as evidence of ownership.
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7.

Pinnacle/Outlook moved the Modular Home from its sales offices to real property

owned by Pinnacle/Outlook located at 10025 North 6800 West, Tremonton, Utah (the
"Property").
B.

The Trustee's Sale of the Modular Home
8.

At the time of or following the transfer of the Modular Home to the Property,

Pinnacle/Outlook executed a trust deed with respect to the Property in favor of Sodberry Ltd. (the
"Sodberry Trust Deed").
9.

In October, 1997, Pinnacle/Outlook defaulted on its obligations arising under the

Credit Agreement, including payment for the Modular Home in the approximate amount of
$42,000. Pinnacle/Outlook also defaulted on its obligations to Sodberry Ltd., and on November,
26, 1997, the successor trustee under the Sodberry Trust Deed filed a Notice of Default with the
Box Elder County Recorder.
10.

On April 1,1998, the Property and the Modular Home were sold pursuant to a

trustee's sale under Utah Code § 57-1-28.
11.

After satisfying Pinnacle/Outlook's obligations arising under the Sodberry Trust

Deed and pursuant to Utah Code § 57-1-29 and Rule 4-507 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, the trustee (i) deposited the Excess Proceeds with the Clerk of the First Judicial
District Court of Box Elder County from the sale of the Property in the approximate amount of
$25,155.56, and (ii) notified the Court Clerk of potential claimants to the Excess Proceeds.
12.

Before the trustee's sale of the Property, Pinnacle/Outlook had not sold the

Modular Home. Deere continues to hold the original MSO, no one ever contacted Deere to
request transfer of the MSO, no discussion of a sale was made during the course of Deere's
SaltLake-l 13062 1 0032672-00001
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business relationship with Pinnacle/Outlook, no notice of sale has been received by Deere, and
no certificate of title or affidavit of affixture has been issued with respect to the Modular Home.
13.

In order to preserve its claim to the Excess Proceeds, Deere timely submitted a

Notice of Claim for the Excess Proceeds.
14.

As of December 10, 1998, Deere's claim against Pinnacle/Outlook, secured by its

perfected security interest in Pinnacle/Outlook's Collateral, including the Modular Home and its
proceeds, was approximately $145,922.64, including $42,179.00 for the Modular Home but
excluding costs and attorneys' fees as permitted under Paragraph 12.6 of the Credit Agreement.
C.

Other Claims to the Excess Proceeds
15.

Tustian asserts that he is entitled to the Excess Proceeds because he, as trustee of

the Snowbird Trust, accepted an assignment of the entire interest in October 1998, accepted a
quit claim deed on January 2, 1998, and filed a mechanic's lien on February 10, 1998.3
16.

Schriever asserts that she is entitled to the Excess Proceeds as a judgment lienor

because she obtained a judgment against Pinnacle/Outlook for $71,168.00 on January 6, 1998.
The judgment was entered in the Second District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, Civil
No. 970907243.

3

Tustian abandoned his mechanic's lien claim in his supplemental memorandum.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the above undisputed facts, the Court hereby makes the following
conclusions of law:
1.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record before the Court shows that

there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991).
2.

The facts material to the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment are not

disputed by the parties; there are no genuine issues of material fact that preclude the entry of
summary judgment on Deere's cross-motion; and the cross-motions are thus ripe for disposition
as a matter of law.
3.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-302(3)(b), Deere perfected a purchase money

security interest ("PMSI") in the Modular Home on April 15, 1991 by filing its UCC-1.
/4J

Because there was no sale of the Modular Home prior to the trustee's sale,

Deere's perfected PMSI continued in the Home until the Home was sold by the Trustee on April
1, 1998.
f 5}

After the trustee's sale, Deere's perfected PMSI continued in the proceeds of the

sale of the Modular Home under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(3)(b) because Deere's UCC-1
covered the original collateral and the proceeds, which are held by this Court, are identifiable
cash proceeds. Accordingly, Deere's perfected PMSI in the Excess Proceeds has priority over
Schriever's and Tustian's claims.
6.

Deere was not obligated to file a fixture filing in order to maintain its perfected

PMSI. Under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-313(4)(d), Deere's perfected security interest remained
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perfected regardless of affixture. See, e ^ In re Lucero. 201 B.R. 322, 324-25 (10th Cir. BAP
1996); In re Allen, 221 B.R. 232 (S.D. 111. 1998); see also Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-313(2) &
401(3).
<1.J

Alternatively, even assuming the Modular Home were physically affixed to the

Property, Deere was not obligated to file a fixture filing because the Home was not legally
affixed to the Property. Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-602(1), an affidavit of affixture must be
filed for a mobile or manufactured home to be considered legally affixed. Because no affidavit
of affixture for the Modular Home has been filed by any party, it was not legally affixed and
therefore no fixture filing was necessary to maintain Deere's perfected PMSI in the proceeds of
the sale of the Modular Home.
8.

Accordingly, Deere has priority to the Excess Proceeds over all other potential

claimants.
8.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-314(3) does not render Deere's perfected PMSI inferior

to Schriever's judgment lien because it has no application to the facts of this case.
9.

If some Excess Proceeds remain after Deere has satisfied its claim against

Pinnacle/Outlook, Schriever has priority to those Proceeds over Tustian. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court adopts the rationale articulated in Schriever's memoranda.
10.

Schriever is a prevailing party relating to the Order to Show Cause and, as such, is

entitled to collect its attorneys fees against Tustian. Schriever's collection of attorneys fees shall
be limited to only those fees expended in connection with the Order to Show Cause relating to
Tustian's re-depositing the Excess Proceeds with the Court.
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11.

Any conclusion of law inappropriately designated as a finding of fact is

incorporated herein by this reference.
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the above undisputed facts and conclusions of
law, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby orders as follows:
(1)

Deere's cross-motion for summary judgment is hereby granted. Deere has

priority to the Excess Proceeds over all other claimants, including Schriever and Tustian.
(2)

The Clerk of this Court shall immediately release the Excess Proceeds to Deere

Credit toward satisfying Deere Credit's perfected purchase money security interest ("PMSI") in
the Moduline modular home, serial no. 116366 (the "Modular Home").
(3)

Schriever's cross-motions for summary judgement is denied in part as it relates to

priority over Deere and is granted in part as it relates to priority over Tustian. Schriever has
priority to the Excess Proceeds over Tustian. Accordingly, if Excess Proceeds remain after
Deere satisfies its perfected PMSI, the Clerk of Court shall release those remaining Excess
Proceeds to Schriever.
(4)

Tustian's cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.

(5)

Schriever's motion for attorneys fees against Tustian is granted. The award of

attorneys fees will be limited only to those fees Schriever expended in connection with the Order
to Show Cause relating to Tustian's re-depositing the Excess Proceeds with the Court. Schriever
is hereby required to submit a attorney fee affidavit pursuant to Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of
Judicial Administration.
(6)

A Judgment which dismisses this action in its entirety with prejudice shall be

entered.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 7^1

day of

T<^

THE HO
FIRST DISTRICT

, 2000.
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:
STOEL RIVES LLP

Matk E. Hindley
Attorney for Defendant
Deere Credit Services, Inc.

William D. Marsh
Attorney for Defendant
Karen Schriever
NALDER, STRATFORD & DRAPER, LC

Alyson Draper
Attorney for Plaintiff
William Tustian
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
W. TUSTIAN, TRUSTEE/ SNOWBIRD TRUST, ;
)
Plaintiff,
;
)
vs.
]
)
KAREN SCHRIEVER, WILLIAM MARSH,
;
DEERE CREDIT SERVICES, INC., BRENT
;
MADSEN, FIRST DISTRICT COURT,
]
Defendants.

On

JUDGMENT
Case No. 980100263
Judge Clint S. Judkins

]

, 2000, this court entered an order (1) granting Deere Credit Services, Inc.'s

("Deere") cross-motion for summary judgement on its claim that it has priority over all other
potential claimants to certain excess proceeds from a trustees sale funds deposited in this court
(the "Excess Proceeds"); (2) granting Karen Schriever ("Schriever") cross-motion for summary
judgment on her claim that she has priority over William Tustian ("Tustian") to the Excess
Proceeds; (3) denying Tustian's cross-motion for summary judgment, and (4) awarding Schriever
SaltLake-l 14781.1 0032672-00001

a portion of her attorney's fees. Having resolved all issues relating to the parties respective
claims to the Excess Proceeds, and finding no just reason for delaying entry of judgement with
regard to all claims,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
(1)

That final judgment is entered in Deere's favor and against Schriever and Tustian

on Deere's claim of priority in the Excess Proceeds.
(2)

That final judgment is entered in favor of Schriever and against Tustian on

Schriever's claim of priority in the Excess Proceeds over Tustian.
(3)

That Tustian take nothing.

(4)

That Schriever recover from Tustian her attorneys fees expended in connection

with the Order to Show Cause relating to Tustian's re-depositing the Excess Proceeds with the
Court.
(5)

That, after disbursement of the Excess Proceeds, this matter be dismissed in its

entirely on the merits and with prejudice.1
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this ^

H

day of

V^^f

'*mFssc^nr\fTHEUOi

, 2000.

E-etTNTS. JODKINS
COURT JUDGE

-z..$a
v ? 1 * <->•'*. •

1

The named "defendants" are not actual defendants. Instead, they are claimants to the
Excess Proceeds under Rule 4-507 of the Rules of Judicial Administration.
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